



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

specified both the ingredients and their relations, but the geometer's definition is hardly a true recipe for a geometrically linear entity.

Why Professor Pitkin feels that from the fact that the cake is not the recipe, it must follow "that the relation between formula and thing to be made has nothing to do with the relation between universal and particular" (p. 133) I do not quite understand. The universal, if it has any meaning at all, is surely primarily an instrument for handling a situation. The most refined form of mathematics is nothing but the result of isolating significant aspects of things because of the fruitfulness of those aspects in handling some class of facts, and this selection is from what is given for the sake of what can be done with it. Professor Pitkin's realism should have taught him that the recipe *is* the cake, only the cake is much more than the recipe, just as the geometrical line is the experienced line, only the experienced line is much more than the geometrical line. The latter fact he fully recognizes in criticizing Pearson. Recipe, formula, and universal express limitations under which a thing exists and the distinction, if it is to be made at all, must be based merely on the degree of adequacy with which those limitations are formulated, but not even the most careful recipe approaches the complexity of concrete actuality, as every amateur cook can testify.

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

La Psychologie Objective. W. BECHTEREW. (Translated from the Russian by N. KOSTYLEFF.) Paris: Alcan. 1913. Pp. 478.

The growing tendency to explain mental life in motor, rather than in sensory, terms is fully embodied in the present work. The definition of psychology as "a description and explanation of states of consciousness" is rejected at the outset. Instead of studying sensations, images, or ideas Professor Bechterew would have us study processes of stimulation and response, neural traces and the association of these traces with new experience, and the determination of the nature of reactions in consequence of the attendant circumstances. Instead of states of consciousness the term "neuro-psychic process" is suggested in the hope of doing away with the contrast between the physical and the psychical. Every neuro-psychic act is reduced to the scheme of the reflex. Under the name "reflexology" objective psychology is said to be a branch of biology. Wherever a reaction is modified by individual experience, we have a psycho-reflex or a neuro-psychic phenomenon in the proper sense of the term. From the above it is clear that although Professor Bechterew regards himself as a behaviorist, he would not limit himself to the study of

organic behavior. Moreover, "the schema of the neuro-psychic process does not exclude a certain parallelism of objective study and introspection." He has already discovered an agreement between introspection and external observation as to the threshold of certain reflexes and the threshold of the corresponding perception. But this is a problem, he adds, that belongs to the future.

The physiological explanation of reflexes and of cerebral traces is in general accord with that set forth in McDougall's primer and similar works. Professor Bechterew is evidently unfamiliar with the more detailed study of reflex mechanisms by Professor Sherrington. That abstraction called the simple reflex is discussed as the fundamental reality, and all the later chapters are built upon this concept. Automatism is classified as simple reflexes, instinct as an extension of simple reflexes, and all the higher mental processes as combinations of simple reflexes modified by cerebral traces. Attention is studied under the name of the reflexes of nervous concentration; discrimination and volition, under the name of the personal reflexes or the reflexes of the personality. Only in the case of these last reflexes is the nervous system supposed to function as a whole.

The explanation of the concept "personality" is limited in this book to a few sentences. In an earlier monograph on the personality, to which he refers us, Professor Bechterew attacks the view of the self as set forth in James and suggests instead a description of the personality similar to that given by Kraepelin. In that monograph Bechterew writes: "According to my view the personality embraces besides the principle of uniformity a directing principle which guides a man's thinking, acting, or refraining from action, and also determines the relation of the individual to his fellow men." The importance of this concept both for psychology and sociology is emphasized in this monograph. In the present work the treatment of this concept is restricted to the following points. In infancy organic impressions determine the child's relations with external impressions. These organic impressions are the basis of individual differentiation, a differentiation which reaches its culminating point in man under the name of personality. Discrimination and volition are reflexes of the personality. "The self of the individual has no anatomic substratum and appears only as a totality of reflexes, the paths of which are traced in the nervous system of the brain." According to this definition with which the present work closes, the personality is not the social self of his earlier monograph nor the psycho-physical organism as in current biological usage, but seems to be identified with what Professor Loeb calls "the associative memory." In a chapter on symbolic reflexes Professor Bechterew shows that he has clearly in mind a distinction, the absence of which sometimes befogs discussion—namely, between the concepts personality and the consciousness of personality. Consciousness of personality he regards as identical with the general estimation of neuro-psychic phenomena. This process of estimation he treats wholly subjectively (pp. 414-415).

From a survey of the book, as a whole, it would appear that Professor Bechterew had set himself the task of writing a new system of psychology in which the biogenetic development of the individual would be studied by the expressive method. But in reality the work embodies under new titles the systems of classification and modes of procedure which many dynamic psychologists are finding inadequate. Psychiatrists, teachers, and other students of the individual are calling for a system of psychology that will throw new light on the underlying complexes in personality, of the normal as well as of the abnormal individual. The present work reveals no acquaintance with the recent studies of individual types and the studies of volitional attitudes, both of which are pointing in the desired direction. The book, however, presents in an attractive style many of the recent ideas that are worked out in greater detail in the writings of Professors Baldwin, Woodworth, and others. Many of the fundamental ideas of the book, such as the conception of an objective psychology, can be traced back to Herbert Spencer, but in urging us to study the behavior of personality as a whole, Professor Bechterew is encouraging a forward movement in psychology. This movement is paralleling the evolution of biological study which began with the study of isolated elements, but to-day emphasizes the study of the whole personality—that is, the psycho-physical individual. The detailed accounts of experiments conducted in the St. Petersburg laboratory under the author's supervision constitute an interesting feature of the book.

NORBERT JOHN MELVILLE.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

The Principle of Relativity in the Light of the Philosophy of Science.

PAUL CARUS. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 105.

This venture of a broad scholar into a field for the detail of which he has only a general interest is perhaps no less pretentious than the augmented title of his discourse. Certainly the light of the philosophy of science is rather feeble if it can shed no better illumination on this important problem of physical science, some phases of which must be still obscured in Dr. Carus's mind, for we read: "We will here at once and dogmatically state that the relativity physicists are perfectly right; what they claim is really and truly a matter of course, and if they only would present their proposition without dressing up their theory in paradoxical statements, nobody would in the least hesitate to accept the new view" (p. 3).

However, we also find: "The new conception, sailing under the flag of the principle of relativity which has been so noisily advanced to replace the old notions, does not prove quite satisfactory and presents too many difficulties to be acceptable to the average mind. . . . The names of Einstein, Lorentz, Minkowski, are the stars of first magnitude among the founders of the new world-conception. Their arguments, mathematically excogitated and worked out with subtle exactness, seem to carry everything before them, and we are not prepared to say that their contentions